An oddly nonlinear debate has emerged in Washington regarding the implications of China's growing power.

Those who are concerned mainly with national defense measure tangibles like China's leaps in military technology, its nuclear and military assistance to other nations and its frequent saber-rattling over various East Asian issues. For them, China is a serious and looming threat.

By contrast, those officials whose principal concerns are improving American-Chinese relations and reciprocal trade reason that the growth of Chinese power is to be expected, that it is defensive rather than expansionist, and that China has no intention of competing with the United States on a global scale.

But whether or not China becomes a global threat in the future is irrelevant to its activities in Asia today. China is definitely on the move, and its full intentions are far from clear.

Last month both The Guangming Daily, a Chinese newspaper, and Taiwan's South China Morning Post reported that the Chinese air force had altered its defensive posture to one focusing mainly on attack readiness, including joint operations involving ground and naval forces. Having benefited from years of technology transfers, many of them from American corporations, the Chinese air force now possesses anti-electronic jamming and air-refueling capabilities as well as greatly improved weapon systems that include air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, high-precision guided bombs and improved firing control equipment.

As the news reports indicated, the Chinese have succeeded in building the armed forces through science and technology, and are ready to fight regional battles, including ground and sea assaults.

This change in strategy has been accompanied by concrete military action. It has been widely reported that the Chinese are dramatically increasing the number of short-range ballistic missiles along the country's coastline near Taiwan, ostensibly in protest of the American declaration that Taiwan would be included in a regional anti-missile system.

Over the past several months the Chinese have also stepped up construction of a military base in the Paracel Islands, 260 miles off the coast of Danang, Vietnam. The base includes a 7,000-foot runway capable of handling a wide array of combat and refueling aircraft.

In addition, the Chinese have expanded an installation in the Spratly Islands off the coast of the Philippines. This installation, according to the Philippine military, now appears to hold a helipad, radar, gun emplacements and a four-story structure whose size belies Chinese claims that they have built shelters for fisherman there. Both the Paracels and the Spratlys are contested territories, neither of them recognized as Chinese under international law.

With respect to the most recent overt threat to Taiwan, the Chinese protest is disingenuous on its face. The Chinese Government knows that we should no more apologize for including Taiwan in plans for missile defense than we did for including South Korea in similar plans. Our having agreed in principle that Taiwan might someday rejoin China does not mean that we would ever allow such a unification to be coerced.

If the reports of bases in the Paracels and Spratlys are accurate, they present a far more serious threat to regional security.

For one thing, they are on islands not recognized under international law to be Chinese. Building military bases on foreign territory, or on territory that is disputed under international law, is a clear act of aggression. That these islands were uninhabited before the appearance of the Chinese military does not lessen the importance of this historic principle.

In addition, these particular islands sit athwart East Asia's major sea lanes. This water route is a superhighway of international commerce for China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines and the Russian port of Vladivostok. Japan, which imports all its oil, is particularly vulnerable to the interdiction of this maritime route, as it is a key leg for ships going through the Malacca and Lombok Straits to and from the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Taiwan itself depends heavily on this sea passage. Coupled with China's recent expansion of its navy, its military control of the Paracels and the Spratlys would constitute a threat to most of the ship-borne commerce moving into and out of east Asia. It could also be used to threaten Japan, and as part of a larger effort to cut off Taiwan.

Another concern is that China has been developing a strategic axis with the Muslim world for more than a decade, as evidenced most clearly by its continuing military assistance to Iran and its role in helping Pakistan develop a nuclear capability. The bases in the Spratlys and Paracels could permit swift military intervention into regions of Southeast Asia that include many heavily Muslim populations, particularly in Malaysia, the southern Philippines (Mindanao is said by American intelligence experts to rival Syria's Bekaa Valley as a training center for Muslim terrorists) -- and in Indonesia, where memories still linger of Chinese backing of an ill-fated coup d'etat in the 1960's.

China's actions in a region that has relied for decades on a delicate balance of power should stir the United States to respond immediately. With the reduced size of the American Navy, east Asia has become more and more nervous in the face of China's growing power.

This unease increased after President Clinton's puzzling announcement during his visit last year that the Administration viewed China as a strategic partner in the region. If Chinese bases are left unchecked, the possibilities of misperceptions regarding American intentions -- even by China itself -- will multiply. These kinds of misperceptions can cause wars, as when, during a January 1950 speech to the National Press Club, Secretary of State Dean Acheson unwittingly encouraged the attack that began the Korean War by failing to include South Korea inside the American zone of interest.

Only the United States can firmly confront the Chinese on this issue. Contrary to internal issues like human rights and gray areas like assisting Pakistan, Chinese bases in the Paracels and the Spratlys are clearly matters with international implications. The United States should lose no time in examining China's expansion of its installations on these islands and, if appropriate, questioning Chinese intentions. And the American Government should keep in mind that the consequence of not confronting China today might be a far more dangerous world in the years to come.

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James Webb was an Assistant Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration.

U.S. Policy Approaches

   Despite recurring sometimes strong friction in U.S.-China relations, many in Beijing see the United States as the key link in the international balance of power affecting Chinese interests. This judgement goes far toward explaining why Chinese leaders in recent years have so avidly sought a visit to China by President Clinton. It would signal to all at home and abroad that the United States has muffled its opposition to, and endorses cooperation with, the Beijing government. Of course, some Chinese leaders remain deeply suspicious of U.S. motives. They believe the U.S. Government is conspiring to weaken and undermine the Chinese leadership and "hold back" or "contain" China from a more prominent position in world affairs.

There is general agreement in the United States that Washington should use its influence to have Beijing conform to international norms and to foster changes over time in China's political, economic, and security systems compatible with U.S. interests. At the same time, there is little agreement in Washington on how the United States should achieve these objectives. In general, there are three approaches influencing U.S. China policy and little indication as to which approach will ultimately prevail.

First is a moderate, "engaged," and less confrontational posture toward China. This is favored by some in the Clinton Administration, Congress, and elsewhere. Some are concerned with perceived fundamental weaknesses in China and urge a moderate approach out of fear that to do otherwise could promote divisions in and a possible breakup of China, with potentially disastrous consequences for U.S. interests in Asian stability and prosperity. Others are impressed with China's growing economic and national strength and the opportunities this provides for the United States. They promote close U.S. engagement with China as the most appropriate way to guide the newly emerging power into channels of international activity compatible with American interests.

Underlying a moderate approach, for some, is a belief that trends in China are moving inexorably in the "right" direction. That is, China is becoming increasingly interdependent economically with its neighbors and the developed countries of the West and is seen as increasingly unlikely to take disruptive action that would upset these advantageous international economic relationships. In addition, greater wealth in China is seen as pushing Chinese society in directions that seem certain to develop a materially better-off, more educated and cosmopolitan populace that will over time press its government for greater representation, political pluralism, and democracy. Therefore, according to this view, U.S. policy should seek to work ever more closely with China in order to encourage these positive long-term trends.

A second approach, held by some U.S. advocates inside and outside of the U.S. Government, encourages U.S. leaders to be less accommodating. Rather than trying to persuade Beijing of the advantages of international cooperation, the United States is advised to keep military forces as a counterweight to rising Chinese power in Asia; to remain firm in dealing with economic, arms proliferation, and other disputes with China; and to work closely with traditional U.S. allies and friends along China's periphery in order to deal with any suspected assertiveness or disruption from Beijing.

Proponents of this policy stress that Beijing officials still view the world as a state-centered competitive environment where power is respected and interdependence counts for little. China's leaders are seen as determined to use whatever means is at their disposal to increase China's wealth and power and as biding their time and conforming to many international norms as China builds economic strength. Once it succeeds with economic modernization, the argument goes, Beijing will be disinclined to curb its narrow nationalistic or other ambitions out of a need for international interdependence or other concerns.

A third approach is based on the premise that the political system in China needs to be changed before the United States has any real hope of reaching a constructive relationship with China. Beijing's communist leaders are inherently incapable of long- term positive ties with the United States. U.S. policy should focus on mechanisms to change China from within while maintaining a vigilant posture to deal with disruptive Chinese foreign policy actions in Asian and world affairs. This view is favored by some U.S. officials and others.

Outlook for U.S. Policy

Given the continued wide range of opinion in the United States over the appropriate U.S. policy toward China, U.S. policy may well continue its recent pattern of trying to accommodate all three approaches. On some issues, such as linking MFN treatment and human rights, the U.S. government has seen U.S. interests best served by an approach that meets PRC concerns. On others, such as intellectual property rights protection and proliferation of missile technology, the United States Government seems prepared to continue to threaten sanctions or to withhold benefits until China conforms to norms acceptable to the United States. Meanwhile, although many U.S. officials would see as counterproductive any declaration by the U.S. Government that a policy goal was to change China's system of government, there is a widespread assumption in the Administration that greater U.S. "engagement" will encourage such desirable changes.