CHINA
Promoting Freedom and
Protecting American Security

Stephen J. Yates 1

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THE ISSUES

The collapse of Soviet Communism and the rise of an economically reformed China raise more questions than answers for U.S. foreign policy. Now that the Cold War is over and the countries of the former Soviet bloc are moving toward market economies and democracy, many Americans wonder whether China will undergo a similar transformation. In fact, the Chinese people today enjoy greater prosperity and control over their own lives than at any time since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

At the same time, however, the images of Chinese tanks rolling into Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, and Chinese missiles landing off the coast of Taiwan during the Republic of China's March 1996 presidential election make one wonder whether the People's Republic of China has changed at all. The concern that the PRC is emerging as a new superpower threat to the United States or as the next evil empire is often expressed. Indeed, China's rapid economic growth over the past two decades has given it greater influence in the world and more capital to invest in its military modernization program. Answers to questions about China's future role in the world and its impact on American interests lie mainly with the Chinese government, yet there are steps U.S. policymakers can take to influence how Beijing chooses to lead this most populous nation in the world.

President Clinton has proposed a policy of engagement with Beijing to encourage China to move in the direction of international security, trade, and internationally accepted human rights norms. As part of this policy, the Administration--from the White House to the Pentagon--has "engaged" in high-level exchanges with Chinese officials. This conveys the misleading impression that the Administration is simply following the policy of its recent Republican predecessors.

The problem is that there is almost as much confusion about the Administration's China policy as there are contradictions in the actions of the Chinese government. The Administration engages in presidential summits and military exchanges with China and, at the same time, is complicit in Beijing's international isolation of free and democratic Taiwan--the primary target of China's military muscle. Moreover, President Clinton has stated his belief that just as the Berlin Wall "inevitably" fell, so too will the Great Wall of China inevitably give way to the forces of economic and political liberty. It is clear, however, that the collapse of Soviet communism had more to do with American strength and allied resolve than with the "inevitable" forces of nature. It is also clear that, left to its own devices, the Chinese government will continue down a path of economic growth while maintaining tight political control and international intransigence.

The 105th Congress accurately reflects the public's confusion and dissatisfaction with the President's China policy. Senator Connie Mack (R-FL) has characterized the Administration's policy as "hollow engagement" and is among the congressional chorus of advocates of a more "meaningful engagement" with China--one that more actively protects American security and promotes freedom and democracy in China.2These are the two main goals by which U.S. policy toward China should be measured.

With the goals of protecting American security and promoting freedom and democracy in mind, and after intense debate over China's trade status in 1997, conservative leaders outside of Congress came together to produce a statement of principles, their joint recommendations for China policy to guide the Administration and congressional leaders. 3These principles were reflected in 11 separate bills comprising the "Policy for Freedom" package presented byRepresentative Chris Cox (R-CA). Nine of these bills were passed overwhelmingly by the House of Representatives in November 1997, immediately following President Clinton's October summit with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Washington (the other two had been added to other legislation passed during the summer). 4Congress should continue to follow this lead and put aside debating whether China will become a hostile adversary or "inevitably" transform into a peaceful democracy. Common sense teaches that Washington should be prepared for the worst while working for the best.

The difficult issues in United States-China relations are complex, but the objectives of U.S. China policy are clear: to protect American security and to promote freedom and democracy in China. These objectives follow closely the priorities articulated in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution: "provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." This wise counsel has served the United States well through periods of great uncertainty for over two centuries. It is still relevant to the policies that America's leaders develop to address the most difficult issues in China policy for the 21st century.

Military Modernization. China has engaged in a determined effort to improve the capabilities and effectiveness of its three million-man People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA is actively purchasing advanced technology, including missile, aircraft, and naval technology, from Russia and other countries. Leaders in Beijing were shocked during the Gulf War by the effectiveness of tiny Kuwait in securing the assistance of a U.S.-led coalition armed with high-tech weapons that easily defeated the conventional armaments of the formidable (at least in number) Iraqi Republican Guard. In seeking advanced weapons technology that it hopes will dominate Taiwan and deter U.S. support for the island republic, Beijing is determined to avoid such a parallel American response in defense of Taiwan.

Proliferation of Nuclear and MissileTechnology. China has been identified as a major source of nuclear and missile technology for Iran and Pakistan, and this has raised serious concerns about its commitment to uphold the conditions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The issue came to a head in October 1997, during the presidential summit in Washington, as the Clinton Administration decided to move ahead with a nuclear cooperation agreement with China despite congressional objections. To demonstrate its supposed commitment to nonproliferation, in September 1997 China had announced new export controls on missiles and nuclear technology. It remains to be seen whether these new export controls will resolve congressional concerns.

Taiwan. From 1956 to 1978, the United States had a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Since 1979, U.S. relations with the ROC have been governed by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which outlines the direct U.S. commitment to the maintenance and development of Taiwan's defense capabilities. 5 It is a matter not just of national honor, but of U.S. law that Washington continually assesses the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, sells Taiwan arms of a defensive nature, and devises a strategy to ensure that any resolution of the standoff between Taiwan and Beijing is achieved by peaceful means and is acceptable to both sides of the Strait. The fact that the mainland "tested" nuclear-capable missiles off the shores of Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, and the fact that Taiwan is a thriving democracy and an important U.S. trading partner, make the provisions of the TRA all the more imperative.

A second issue regarding China and Taiwan is their applications for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Taiwan's application as a separate customs territory has progressed further and faster than has China's application, due largely to Taiwan's high level of economic development and free-market institutions. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced in February the conclusion of a market access agreement with Taiwan, thereby eliminating a key hurdle in the way of Taiwan's WTO entry. However, many in Taiwan and the United States now fear that the Clinton Administration will try to placate Beijing by stalling Taiwan's entry into the WTO until the PRC itself is ready to join.

The most important human rights issues in Taiwan are the continuation of clean and competitive elections at all levels of government and the struggle to resist the military threat and diplomatic isolation imposed by Beijing. Taiwan has undergone a remarkable transformation from a one-party authoritarian state with no tolerance for dissent to a competitive multiparty government with direct elections at every level and a free press. In fact, one of the key challenges for Washington is to decide how to react if the free people of Taiwan, through their democratic process, choose to declare formal independence from China--a move that promises to bring a harsh, possibly military response from Beijing. Similarly, with their successful economic development and democratization, the people of Taiwan deserve to have their democratically elected representatives participate in international organizations and forums, especially those dealing with economic and social issues. Beijing's success at excluding Taiwan's representatives from international organizations and meetings violates the rights of the people of Taiwan, and the governments of the developed world are partly to blame for caving in to Beijing's unreasonable demands. The U.S. government should play no part in this shameful containment of a free-market democracy.

Nondiscriminatory Trade Status. The issue of most favored nation (MFN) trading status for China has been complicated unnecessarily by a misunderstanding of what MFN means. "MFN" is trade jargon for the normal status the U.S. grants to virtually every trading partner. In fact, with the exception of six small countries, every nation in the world has received MFN status.6Even Iraq, a nation that the United States may yet again confront in war, has not been denied. Furthermore, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other free-trade agreements offer more favorable terms than does MFN status.

MFN is also frequently misunderstood as a policy tool. It is a trade policy and part of trade negotiations (especially for joining the WTO). Because the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act denied MFN to all non-market economies that do not allow free emigration (a policy which was aimed largely at freeing Soviet Jews), MFN has been mistaken for an anti-communist human rights policy. Although Jackson-Vanik may have served its purpose during the height of the Cold War, however, the global environment has changed. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and even if all the nations of the world allowed free emigration, the United States would not allow free immigration.

Denying MFN to China solves nothing, and extending MFN alone cannot solve the wide array of U.S. concerns with regard to China's human rights, trade, and security policies. New legislation, like that contained in the Policy for Freedom package, is necessary to create specific policies that will address the specific problems in U.S. relations with China.

Outstanding U.S. trade concerns with China--like unfair trade practices, most favored nation trade status, and intellectual property protection--should be resolved in the course of negotiations over China's entry into the World Trade Organization. China has been in the process of applying for entry into the WTO for more than 11 years. This application has languished as WTO members wait for China to lower its tariffs and other trade barriers significantly, improve legal protection of contracts and property rights, and open up more of its economy--especially services like banking and insurance--to foreign participation.

Human Rights. Ever since the Chinese government sent tanks into Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, the issue of human rights in China has increased in interest and importance to Americans. Every year the State Department publishes a comprehensive report documenting human rights abuses in China, ranging from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment to forced abortion and religious persecution.7This report catalogs instances in which the Chinese government has used intimidation, harassment, or brute force to control free expression, religion, family planning, and other aspects of Chinese life. It demonstrates that Beijing has taken a particularly harsh stand against religious organizations that refuse to register with the government. According to Nina Shea, director of the Religious Freedom Project at Freedom House, China today has more Christians in prison because of religious activities than any other state. Believers within the Roman Catholic Church, for example, are forced to affiliate with the government-sanctioned Catholic Patriotic Association, which does not recognize the ultimate earthly authority of the Pope. Foreigners also face tight restrictions in exercising their religious rights inside China. Decrees issued in recent years bar them from importing Bibles and religious tracts for distribution, as well as evangelizing, establishing schools, and appointing religious leaders. 8

Although Americans have long been aware of the problems that must be addressed in China, how to resolve these problems most effectively has been the subject of heated and serious debate. Some have called for a boycott of Chinese-made goods or other formal linkage of trade to progress on human rights. Others have called for greater access to China through commerce and trade as the way to bring about greater individual liberty and respect for human rights. U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) framed the latter viewpoint well in remarks to the Foreign Affairs College during his visit to Beijing on March 29, 1997:

America cannot remain silent about the basic lack of freedom--speech, religion, assembly, the press--in China. Were we to do so, we would not only betray our own tradition, we would also fail to fulfill our obligations as a friend of China. For no one can be considered a true friend if that person avoids the truth.... The historic truth is that economic vitality ultimately depends upon political freedom.

Hong Kong. On July 1, 1997, Britain ceded sovereignty over the territory of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China. This transfer of sovereignty was the result of negotiations between Britain and China during the 1980s. The key product of these negotiations was the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which promises that Hong Kong's people will rule Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy. The United States recognized the Joint Declaration as an international treaty in the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act. It is, therefore, a matter of international law that both parties to this treaty abide by the solemn obligations undertaken in the Joint Declaration.

The United States has substantial interests at stake in Hong Kong--interests that will endure long into the future. Foremost among these concerns is the security of the more than 35,000 U.S. citizens and 1,100 U.S. firms in Hong Kong. Beyond this, the United States has an interest in maintaining close cooperation with Hong Kong authorities to fight such threats as drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal immigration, and the proliferation of weapons and sensitive technologies.

For the United States, the key human rights issues in Hong Kong are the status of the civil liberties enshrined in Hong Kong's Bill of Rights and the degree of progress that is (or is not) made toward the objective--outlined in the Joint Declaration and Hong Kong's Basic Law--of establishing a government by universal suffrage. With the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, a chief executive was appointed to replace the colonial governor, and a provisional legislative council was selected to replace the Legislative Council that had been elected democratically in 1995. Since that time, key civil liberties ordinances have been amended so that the freedoms of assembly and association are more tightly regulated, but there have been no reported cases of demonstrations that have been stopped or associations that have been shut down as a direct result of those amendments.

The appointed provisional legislature also passed a new election law to govern the election in May 1998 of the first Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). The Democratic Party and its allies, the majority in the Legislative Council elected in 1995, boycotted the establishment of the provisional legislative council and expect to have many fewer seats in the new Legislative Council than they had won in the 1995 election--partly because of changes made in the election law. These civil liberties, the continuation of democratization, a free press, and free markets are all critical elements in Hong Kong's future success and are crucial to the protection of U.S. interests in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong's future will have a tremendous impact on the long-held interests of the United States in regional peace and stability. Because much U.S. trade and investment in China flows through Hong Kong, maintaining a free, open, and safe business environment in Hong Kong is vitally important to U.S. access to China's markets. More important, the approach Beijing takes in dealing with free-market democracy in Hong Kong will be a key indicator of how Beijing intends to deal with Taiwan and other free-market democracies in Asia. Encroachment on the freedom and autonomy of Hong Kong, or an assertive Chinese military presence there, will fuel cross-Strait tension with Taiwan and heighten already growing security concerns throughout Asia.

Tibet. Human rights and religious freedom in Tibet are two of the key issues discussed every year during the MFN debate. It is unclear when, if ever, the United States has declared an official policy specifically toward Tibet. Almost by assumption, Tibet has been recognized as part of China, not as an independent country, even though history may say otherwise. What is clear is that ever since the Communist Party established control over the region in the 1950s, Tibetans have endured periods of starvation, intense religious persecution, and gross violations of human rights, all in the name of Chinese national unity. At the bidding of human rights activists in the United States, including famous Buddhist actors in Hollywood, the U.S. government is urged annually to craft and improve U.S. foreign policy tools to pressure Beijing to deal with the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan leader, and to loosen Beijing's tight controls over Tibet.

As part of his consolidation of power at the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) ordered Chinese military troops into Tibet in October 1950. In May 1951, the Tibetan government signed an agreement that maintained the power of Tibet's Dalai Lama in domestic affairs and gave Beijing control of Tibet's defense and foreign affairs--a "one country, two systems" approach to government that is similar in theory to what is practiced in Hong Kong today. By late 1958, widespread resentment of China's efforts to establish a social system of people's communes in Tibet boiled over into an active revolt, which was quashed by the Chinese military in 1959. The Dalai Lama fled to India and established a government in exile that remains active and is a constant irritation to Beijing today.

To forcibly "reform" Tibetan society and bring it into conformity with the rest of Chinese society, monasteries were destroyed, monks jailed and executed, and ordinary citizens punished for even possessing a picture of the Dalai Lama. In 1980, the Chinese government admitted that Tibet had been misgoverned and announced plans for new reforms. But these reforms were based on economic development and infusion of ethnic (Han) "expertise," not on a return to the religion-based society that existed before 1959. Monasteries were rebuilt and restored, and the central government began to subsidize development projects; but the religious activities of Tibetan monks and ordinary citizens remained under the close scrutiny of China's state security apparatus, and the beloved Dalai Lama remained in exile.

Tibet remains a remote and tightly controlled area inside of China, and the status of the Dalai Lama, religious freedom, the future of democracy, and the promise of government and cultural autonomy for Tibet remain unresolved issues.

THE FACTS

China plans to increase spending on its military by nearly 13 percent in 1998. Expenditures on its three million-man army have increased sharply since the late 1980s, rising by double digits in most years despite a worldwide trend toward lower military budgets: by 21 percent in 1995, for example, and 12.7 percent in 1996. China says its military budget is smaller than that of the United States, but actual spending is believed to be several times higher than reported. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated in 1996 that China's armed forces spent up to $56 billion. 9

China is changing the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait by acquiring European and Russian technology to build high-resolution radar satellites; upgrading its ballistic, anti-ship, and land-attack cruise missiles; and acquiring new fighter jets, radar aircraft, and submarines.10(See Chart 15.1.)

Taiwan's legislative elections will be held in December 1998. The Democratic Progressive Party, a traditional advocate of independence for Taiwan, has its first real chance to achieve a governing majority. The PRC has vowed to use military force, if necessary, to keep Taiwan from making any formal declaration of independence.

On July 1, 1997, Great Britain ceded sovereignty over the territory of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China. The legal basis for the transfer of sovereignty was the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed on December 19, 1984. As part of the transition from British Dependent Territory to Special Administrative Region of the PRC, the legislative council elected in 1995 was dissolved on June 30, 1997, and immediately replaced by an appointed provisional legislature. According to a newly revised statute, elections will be held on May 24, 1998, to constitute the first official Legislative Council of the SAR.

China's economy remains mostly unfree. The People's Republic of China ranks 120th among the 156 economies studied in the 1998 Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom. 11China is categorized as mostly unfree because of its very high levels of protectionism and government intervention in the economy and its poor protection of property rights. Although China has maintained high levels of economic performance over the past 15 years, the Index shows that its economic institutions remain mostly unfree and could seriously limit future growth, especially in the banking and finance sector, if left unreformed.

Hong Kong's economy remains the freest in the world. Hong Kong ranks first among the 156 economies studied in the 1998 Index of Economic Freedom. Hong Kong is categorized as the world's freest economy. So far, there is little evidence that becoming a part of China has altered its economic structure significantly. There continues to be little government interference in the marketplace; taxes remain low and predictable; increases in government spending are linked closely to economic growth; foreign trade still is free; and regulations, in addition to being transparent, continue to be applied both uniformly and consistently.

Economic freedom kept Taiwan's economy strong in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. Taiwan ranks seventh among the 156 economies studied in the 1998 Index of Economic Freedom. Taiwan is categorized as free largely because of its low levels of protectionism and government intervention in the economy, as well its stable monetary policy and very high level of property rights protection.

China's government continues to commit well-documented human rights abuses in violation of internationally accepted norms. These abuses stem from its very limited tolerance of public dissent, a fear of unrest, and the limited scope or inadequate implementation of laws protecting basic freedoms. The constitution and other laws provide for fundamental human rights, but they often are ignored. Abuses include torture and mistreatment of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest, and lengthy incommunicado detention. Prison conditions at many facilities remain harsh. The government continues its tight restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, and religion, and on privacy and workers' rights. Serious human rights abuses persist in minority areas, including Tibet and Xinjiang, and in some cases have intensified. 12

The PRC Constitution states that the "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious practice ." Yet through a registration process, the government monitors membership in religious organizations, meetings, religious training, clergy selection, publication of religious materials, and funding for religious activities. This control, exercised by the Religious Affairs Bureau under the State Council, also violates Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 13

Religion is important to the Chinese. The Chinese government acknowledges 100 million believers, in all faiths, out of a population of 1.2 billion, but it has been using this figure since the mid-1950s.14Despite government controls, officially recognized temples, churches, and mosques in many parts of China are filled to capacity. Catholics and other Christians reportedly form long lines to participate in the next Mass or service. 15

The Chinese Christian Council determines the number of authorized Protestant Bibles to be printed and sells them through 50 centers at about 50 percent of cost. By August 1997, the fully licensed Amity Printing Company had produced some 20 million Bibles. 16According to the U.S. State Department, the Chinese government supervised the printing of more than three million Bibles in both 1996 and 1997.17

According to official figures, there are 4,000 Catholic clergy and over 4,600 churches and meeting houses in China. Private estimates of China's Catholic population exceed 10 million. 18There is no Vatican representative. Bishops in the official Catholic Church are not ordained by Rome, but many have an unofficially acknowledged "relationship with Rome." 19

The Chinese government maintains that there are between 10 million and 15 million registered Protestants , 18,000 clergy, over 12,000 churches, and some 25,000 meeting places in China. Private estimates of the Protestant population range from 35 million to 60 million, taking into account the millions of people who worship in private house churches. 20

In October 1997, the government signed the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESAR) and allowed the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit China. During 1997, a number of dissidents, academics, and former officials issued public statements, letters, or petitions challenging the government's policies and advocating political reform. 21

China has not yet signed or ratified the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), although it has announced its intention to do so. This covenant, more than the ICESAR, recognizes and protects fundamental civil liberties like those outlined in the U.S. Bill of Rights. China pledged in the Joint Declaration to apply the protections outlined in this covenant to Hong Kong.

The Chinese government's efforts to introduce a measure of democratic voting and assembly procedures represent a definite and positive step forward in the nation's delicate move toward a more democratic and participatory form of local government. 22However, these democratically elected local officials lack the authority to change the national family planning policy or to improve the country's incomplete legal and judicial process. As the level of government closest to the people, and faced with the discipline of competitive elections, these officials are more responsive to the interests of the people. Local village elections may seem like a small step, but they make a significant difference to the more than 800 million Chinese citizens who live in rural areas and now enjoy a small measure of democracy.

THE RECORD

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

After campaigning in 1992 to link China's MFN trading status to its human rights record, President Clinton reversed himself in 1994. The President dropped his human rights demands and supported MFN for China two months after the Chinese leadership had publicly humiliated the Secretary of State during a March 1994 visit to Beijing. This was the correct decision, but the Administration's ill-conceived linkage strategy forced it into a series of policy retreats and flip-flops that undermined U.S. credibility throughout the region.

The Administration's mishandling of ROC President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in June 1995 reinforced this problem. At first, the Clinton Administration caved in to Beijing's protests and resisted granting a visa so that Taiwan's President Lee could pay an unofficial visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. The Administration argued that granting a visa would violate its "one-China" policy. Then, in response to nearly unanimous congressional condemnation of this decision, the Administration relented and permitted President Lee to make a private visit to Cornell. This decision was the right one, but it should have been made when Beijing first protested. The ROC should have been spared the painful ordeal that angered all involved and further undermined U.S. credibility.

In yet another misstep, the Clinton Administration in February 1995 mishandled the Chinese navy's occupation of Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. Mischief Reef is a small atoll well within the Philippines' 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone but claimed variously by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The Administration took three months to muster only a mild diplomatic protest in response to China's breach of international law.

China decided to express its disapproval of U.S. support for President Lee's visit and the tepid U.S. response to the Mischief Reef confrontation by conducting large-scale military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, including the firing of nuclear-capable missiles near Taiwan in July 1995. After this provocative act, the Administration did nothing. Only after the Chinese began preparing for a larger show of force in early 1996 did the Clinton Administration belatedly take action, dispatching two aircraft carriers to the area.(See Map 15.2.)

Since 1996, the Clinton Administration has made a concerted effort to improve relations with Beijing. Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced in May 1996 that the Administration desires more frequent and regular meetings with Chinese officials at the highest levels, including an exchange of presidential visits. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake traveled to Beijing in July 1996 to smooth relations further and to discuss preparations for a presidential summit in Washington. In November 1996, the President traveled to Asia, announcing bold plans to deepen U.S. engagement in the region and stabilize relations with China.

But by early 1997, these plans were hijacked by a growing controversy over allegations of illegal fundraising by the President's supporters from Asian and Chinese sources during the 1996 presidential campaign, as well as accusations of a plot by the Chinese government to fund operations in the United States designed to influence elections and foreign policy decisions. At the same time, a campaign to deny China's MFN status included published reports of China's human rights abuses and religious persecution.

The President's response to these challenges was to assume a low profile on China issues. He addressed China issues in public speeches only when required by law, when notifying Congress of his decision to extend China's MFN status, and when required by protocol on the Friday before his October 1997 summit with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. In the interim, he sent Vice President Gore on an awkward trip to China in March 1997 to prepare for the upcoming summit and left congressional and media questions to his National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.

Meanwhile, the country and Congress were engaging in a vigorous debate over China policy--a debate from which the President was noticeably absent until the very last moment. And when the President did speak, he tended to accentuate the positive with regard to his policy, leaving many tough questions unanswered and many in Congress to wonder whether the President really had a plan to address their key concerns. The President's ineffectual and delayed reactions have cost America much in lost prestige and credibility in Asia. The ROC feels more threatened, the PRC more emboldened, and the entire region of Asia more uncertain--not only about Beijing's intentions, but also about America's credibility and staying power.

CONGRESS

U.S. policy toward China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan has received an unusual amount of attention from the 105th Congress. The heightened level of interest has been driven by the emergence of important issues like the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China, Beijing's use of missile diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, the visit of the Dalai Lama of Tibet to the United States, the 1996 campaign contribution controversy, and well-publicized religious concerns. Interest in China policy is also driven by a general dissatisfaction with the Clinton approach to China and the desire of many in Congress to craft new policy tools to address specific concerns about China that have not been addressed sufficiently by Clinton's policy or the extension of MFN.

During 1997, after a heated and divisive debate, the 105th Congress voted by a 259-173 margin to extend China's MFN status, with two-thirds of Republicans and one-half of Democrats voting in favor of the extension. The real drama in the China policy debate during the 105th Congress, however, was in seeing the first serious efforts by several Members of Congress to devise new policy options for the United States to address human rights and national security concerns with China outside the MFN framework.

On May 23, 1997, for example, Senator Spencer Abraham (R-MI) introduced the China Sanctions and Human Rights Advancement Act (S. 810, later reintroduced as the China Policy Act of 1997), which was based on three principles: punish the transgressor; cut aid, not trade; and strengthen the promotion of democracy. Senators Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Connie Mack (R-FL) both cosponsored the bill, in addition to introducing their own bills or supporting other bills introduced in the House of Representatives. Senator Brownback succeeded in getting significant portions of the China package crafted by Representatives John Porter (R-IL) and David Dreier (R-CA) passed as amendments to other Senate legislation, but many of the provisions were struck down in conference. Senator Mack brought together all of the separate provisions included in Representative Cox's Policy for Freedom package in one bill (S. 1083), which he introduced in the Senate on July 29, 1997. Even with a high level of cooperation among the Senators, these bills still await committee and floor action. The passage of the Cox package in the House makes prospects appear better for passage of Senator Mack's China National Security and Freedom Protection Act (S. 1083).

In the House, Representatives Porter and Dreier, at the urging of Speaker Gingrich, on June 26, 1997, introduced H.R. 2095, a bill to address human rights and other concerns in China without sanctions or other trade restrictions. On June 23, 1997, Representative Asa Hutchinson (R-AR) introduced H.R. 2011, a version of the Abraham bill.

The only new China legislation to make it to a vote was the Policy for Freedom package. This collection of 11 separate bills incorporating the same sound principles as Senator Abraham's bill not only made it to the House floor for a vote, but was passed in early November by an average margin of 388-31 during the week immediately following Clinton's Washington summit with Jiang Zemin. The Policy for Freedom package included bills that specifically addressed China's espionage activities in the United States, its human rights violations, its violent suppression of religion, its international purchases of nuclear technology, its arms sales to Iran, and its aggression against Taiwan. With the passage of these new China bills, it is now up to the Senate to consider each bill as it is reported out of the House or else to consider Senator Mack's China National Security and Freedom Protection Act, an omnibus version of the separate bills contained in the Policy for Freedom package.

WHAT TO DO IN 1999

China has emerged not only as a major player in Asia and the world, but also a major challenge to U.S. policymakers who are concerned about protecting U.S. security and promoting freedom and democracy around the globe. The United States has long-standing interests in Asia that will be affected profoundly by the direction China takes in its own development and by the actions China takes in Asia and beyond. Traditional U.S. interests in Asia include maintaining freedom of navigation, deterring aggression, and securing access to markets. But to do as the framers of the U.S. Constitution instructed--to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity"--policymakers should seek new ways to protect and promote freedom and democracy in the region.

One of the most important constitutional roles for Congress is to scrutinize the actions (or inaction) of the Administration in managing U.S. relations with China. Policymakers do not require a perfect knowledge of China's past or a crystal ball to see China's future in order to develop clear, commonsense steps for protecting and advancing U.S. interests. The Statement of Principles on China Policy endorsed in 1997 by a coalition of concerned Americans of various political persuasions is a useful guide to how the President and Congress should approach China policy. Debates about whether China will become a hostile adversary or transform itself inevitably into a peaceful democracy should be avoided. Washington should be prepared for the worst but work for the best.

Thus, to protect the United States against the threat of a militarily aggressive China, and at the same time encourage China's development toward peace and democracy, the President and Congress should commit themselves to do all they can to protect American security and promote freedom and democracy in China.

Protecting Security Interests in Asia

"Peace through strength" is one of the Reagan Doctrine's greatest legacies; it brought the Soviet Union to its knees and ended the Cold War--as Lady Thatcher puts it, "without a single shot being fired." 23This principle remains just as viable in the post-Cold War world, yet it requires a strong national defense to deter the emergence of new hegemonic regimes. Today, China is engaged in a deliberate strategy to modernize and significantly increase the capabilities of its military. American policymakers must ensure that the United States has a military and alliance structure strong enough to deter China from military expansion or aggressive adventurism. To enhance America's military strength in Asia, the Administration and Congress should work together to:

 

Upgrade U.S. defense capabilities. Beijing must realize that its military modernization does not exist in a vacuum. Although it has a right to modernize its military, such developments--viewed next to its missile tests off Taiwan and its adventurism in the South China Sea--contribute to an arms race in Asia and drive the need in the United States to develop and deploy more advanced weapons systems in the region. In addition to the need for advanced missile defense systems, the United States should upgrade its regional aircraft and anti-aircraft capabilities to counteract China's purchase of advanced Russian fighter jets.

Develop and deploy effective theater missile defenses in Asia. Given China's determination to upgrade its missile technology and capabilities, its willingness to use nuclear-capable missiles to intimidate Taiwan, and its proclivity to proliferate, it is imperative that the United States develop and deploy an effective missile defense strategy both in Asia and for the United States (see Chapter 13).

Maintain U.S. air superiority in Asia and deploy the F-22 fighter to Asia. As China purchases advanced Russian, Israeli, and European technology to modernize its air forces, the U.S. military must maintain its margin of technological superiority in the region. It is imperative that modern combat aircraft like the F-22 and new radar aircraft like the E-8 Joint-Stars radar aircraft be deployed to Asia.

Sell defensive arms to Taiwan. Under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is legally required to assist Taiwan in providing for its self-defense. The 1982 Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué to reduce U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was based on the premise that the Chinese government would make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the settlement of this issue. Considering China's provocative military exercises and nuclear-capable missile tests near Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, continued defensive arms sales to Taiwan are appropriate and consistent with both the TRA and joint communiqués with China. Taiwan's relative military strength will promote peace through deterrence, while its weakness will only invite aggression and invasion.

Maintain U.S. naval forces deployed in Japan and improve military cooperation with Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.As China modernizes its naval forces, it is essential that the United States retain sufficient forward-deployed naval forces in Asia, particularly an aircraft carrier battle group stationed in Japan. The United States should improve alliance cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, and expand military cooperation with non-allied countries like Singapore.

Urge U.S. allies like Israel and Britain not to sell advanced military technology to China. China is relying heavily on foreign technology to aid its military modernization program; the United States should not tolerate such military sales to China by U.S. allies as long as the potential exists for a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan.

Require the Pentagon to clarify the objectives of its exchanges with the Chinese military. In addition, the Pentagon should set precise limits on the type of information the United States is willing to share and articulate a strategy to ensure that China reciprocates and shares its military information with the United States. Military exchanges with China can be successful provided the People's Liberation Army is as open about its plans and modernization as is the U.S. military. In addition, the United States should improve its military contacts with Taiwan to improve communication and mutual confidence.

Increase funding for the intelligence community and focus priorities on the People's Liberation Army. The United States needs more information about China's military intentions and capabilities in order to develop and deploy an appropriate deterrent.

Identify firms owned or controlled by the Chinese military and discourage trade with those firms to restrict the flow of money to China's military modernization efforts. The People's Liberation Army maintains a vast business empire that increasingly exports and invests abroad. The United States should take the lead in identifying PLA-owned and PLA-controlled corporations so that U.S. citizens and businesses can make better informed economic choices.

Tighten controls on high-tech transfers to include dual-use items like supercomputers, helicopters, and laser technology. China is seeking to use civilian technology to boost its military modernization. The United States should maintain strict controls on such dual-use technology until China poses less of a military threat in Asia.

Urge China to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The United States should urge China to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an informal coalition of countries that sets common standards to control the export of nuclear technology.

Promoting Freedom and Democracy in China

After addressing national interests by establishing a strong defense, U.S. policymakers should find ways to protect and empower those abroad who share our fundamental beliefs in peace, freedom, and democracy. These steps would include efforts to promote freer trade, expand democracy, and develop the rule of law. The efforts and accomplishments of democrats and freedom fighters in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China should not go unnoticed. Policymakers should find ways to offer America's recognition of and support for their efforts. In addition, they should improve the quantity and quality of information going into and coming out of China. This would ensure that U.S. concerns and beliefs are communicated accurately to a wide audience in China, and that Americans are informed on important developments in China.

To promote freedom and democracy in China, policymakers in the United States should:

 

Counter China's attempts to isolate Taiwan or its leaders. The United States should not aid--either intentionally or inadvertently--the PRC's attempts to block the foreign travel of Taiwan's leaders or to interfere with the ability of ROC officials to conduct Taiwan's foreign relations. With a strong economy and vibrant democracy, Taiwan is clearly prepared to make significant contributions to the international community through institutions involved in trade, economic development, and humanitarian assistance. Beijing's success in shutting Taiwan out of the international community has limited the Republic of China's ability to offer such advice and assistance to other Asian economies.

Hold China to the promises it made to the people of Hong Kong in the 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration. China promised that the people of Hong Kong would rule Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy in all areas except defense and foreign affairs. This autonomy is critical not only to the preservation of democracy and economic freedom in Hong Kong, but also to the protection of U.S. interests, such as fighting drug trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, and commercial piracy.

Meet with pro-democracy and pro-freedom leaders from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet. In 1997, President Clinton had unofficial visits with Wei Jingsheng, Martin Lee, and the Dalai Lama. Similar meetings with high-level Taiwanese officials were not even considered, however, because of the Administration's definition of its "one-China" policy. Since Congress is in no way bound by any Administration policy to determine with whom and under what conditions it meets, members of the 106th Congress should plan to meet openly and officially with all of these advocates of peace, freedom, and democracy.

Travel to China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Foreign travel offers Members of Congress an opportunity to witness the social and economic transformation taking place in this region, but it also provides an important opportunity to raise personal and constituent concerns with the governments of these countries. Travel to China shows Beijing that Congress is serious about concerns raised in Washington debates and that Congress is monitoring its actions very closely. Travel to Hong Kong and Taiwan sends a signal to Beijing that Congress has not overlooked either their importance or their freedom and democracy.

Encourage constituents to visit churches in China, participate in services, and establish relationships with members of their faith in China. Although many aspects of religious life in China are tightly regulated by the state, Chinese Christians are permitted to invite foreign pastors to preach and to accept contributions for building and operational funds. American Christians should take advantage of these opportunities to extend fellowship to members of their faith in China. Since many members of unregistered churches also attend state-sanctioned churches, they also would benefit from this demonstration of faith and fellowship.

Speak out on the value of freedom. Concerned U.S. policymakers should follow Speaker Gingrich's example of frank and open diplomacy. They should take every opportunity to remind China that, because economic freedom is intimately tied to political freedom, it is imperative that China's economic success be accompanied by Beijing's political openness.

Speak out on behalf of prisoners incarcerated for expressing their religious or political beliefs. In 1997, a handful of well-known dissidents were released from prison, most notably Wei Jingsheng. Despite the Chinese government's insistence that it holds no political prisoners, thousands remain in prison for peaceful expression of their political, social, or religious views. The best-known are Wang Dan, Liu Nianchun, Gao Yu, Pastor Xu Yongze, Bishop Zeng Jingmu, Chadrel Rinpoche, and Ngawang Choephel. Members of Congress should speak out on their behalf in congressional resolutions, public speeches, and meetings.

Increase the number of personnel at the U.S. embassy and consulates in China who are assigned to work on human rights, religious persecution, and security topics. U.S. diplomats in China spend a great deal of time arranging for diplomatic visits, evaluating visa applications, and facilitating U.S. participation in commercial projects. Sufficient personnel should be allocated to ensure that American officials devote an appropriate amount of time to important issues like human rights, religious persecution, and security.

Increase funding for the promotion of democracy. Organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute are contributing to the improvement and expansion of democratic reform in China and Hong Kong. Greater recognition and financial support is in order to help them expand their efforts and increase personnel.

Increase funding and other support for Voice of America and Radio Free Asia broadcasts in China. A fundamental prerequisite for the development of a free market and representative government is the free flow of information. In economics, the goal is "perfect information." In politics, the goal is "a well-informed citizenry." As long as China's press remains government-controlled, the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia are vital for getting accurate and unfiltered news and information into China.

Promote the expansion of China's private sector as a way to diminish government control and micromanagement of personal lives. Developing China's private sector through commerce and trade is the best way to free the Chinese people from government control in the short term. Most of the government controls over people's lives in China are implemented through the state-owned sector. Private-sector employment makes it possible for the Chinese to choose alternatives to government regulation and restriction. The United States cannot contribute to expanding the private sector without giving China normal (most favored nation) trade status.

Urge China to further reduce trade barriers and increase the transparency of its trade rules and regulations. China has made progress in reducing tariffs and other trade barriers, but they still fall short of WTO standards. Although trade liberalization may face tough domestic resistance, especially fears of increased unemployment, allowing more U.S. firms to compete in China and to hire workers could help alleviate the unemployment created by economic reform and trade liberalization.

Q & A

Q. How should the United States respond to China's growing military threat, human rights abuses, and unfair trade practices?

A. Policymakers should build upon the principles endorsed in the conservative Statement of Principles on China Policy and contained in Representative Chris Cox's Policy for Freedom legislative package. This policy recommends strengthening America's military presence in Asia, protecting Americans and U.S. allies against missile attack, and maintaining air and naval superiority in Asia to deter Chinese military aggression. This policy promotes freedom and democracy in China by increasing the number of U.S. officials in China assigned to work on human rights, religious, and security affairs; promoting private-sector expansion in China; reaching out to religious believers; and speaking out on behalf of political and religious prisoners.

Q. Is China an enemy or a threat to the United States?

A. China is not an enemy of the United States in the same sense that the Soviet Union was. The Soviet Union was actively engaged in destabilizing governments around the world and luring countries into its sphere of influence. Moreover, the Soviets placed nuclear weapons aimed at U.S. territory only 90 miles off the Florida coast. Beijing's actions, however, could threaten U.S. interests even if China is not perceived as an enemy. It is imperative that the United States maintain military superiority in Asia to deter aggression and deploy a missile defense system to protect both America and its allies against the increasing threat of missile attack. The United States must stop China's technology and weapons transfers because they jeopardize U.S. interests in regions like the Middle East. If China were to become expansionist, the U.S. would have to try to contain it; in the meantime, it should try to change China from within.

Q. Containment worked against the Soviet Union; why wouldn't it work against China?

A. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union militarily occupied and effectively controlled many neighboring countries. As the Soviets moved west in Europe and south in Asia, U.S. and allied forces implemented a strategy to contain the spread of communism. Later, especially under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan, the United States unveiled a strategy that went beyond containing Soviet expansionism to "rolling back" communist control until Soviet puppet regimes, and eventually the Soviet Union itself, collapsed. Since China has not engaged in military expansion in the same manner as the Soviet Union, a similar "rollback" policy is not appropriate. The United States should maintain the military capacity and will to deter aggression and contain expansionism. At the same time, Washington should find ways to encourage positive change within China.

Q. Since China abuses its people, why should we trade with Beijing?

A. Trade is not an endorsement of China's treatment of its people. In fact, in a country like China that has a small private sector, trade can help people escape the government's intrusive social controls. Government firms in China control the lives of their workers by making them dependent on subsidized food, shelter, clothing, child care, and education. Government workers must obey "voluntary" regulations like the "one child" policy or risk losing their benefits. Employees at private firms earn higher wages and are free to choose where to live, what to eat, and how to educate and care for their children. As the private sector in China grows, so too will the scope of these freedoms. Trade is no substitute for a human rights policy, but a proper human rights policy should punish the transgressor (China's government), not the victims of oppression (ordinary people).

Q. Why should we be giving special trading privileges to a country that persecutes Christians, proliferates weapons of mass destruction, and exports goods made by slave labor to the U.S.?

A. This question presumably is about the annual debate surrounding the extension of China's most favored nation trading status. First, MFN is not a human rights policy. Many Americans believe expanding China's fledgling private sector through trade is an effective way to promote greater freedom in China. But MFN alone cannot address all human rights and national security concerns. Measures like those passed in the House during 1997 are necessary to provide specific solutions to specific problems outside of the MFN framework. Second, "most favored nation" is outdated trade jargon. Any treatment that is granted to all but six small countries can hardly be considered special. The fact that the United States has maintained a tough trade embargo on Iraq without revoking MFN demonstrates that MFN is not a relevant diplomatic or foreign policy tool.

Q. Shouldn't we lean on Taiwan to cool down its independence rhetoric to avoid annoying Beijing?

A. The conflict between Taiwan and Beijing has a long history and involves many complex issues. There is no simple solution. The United States has wisely avoided getting in the middle of this conflict to play a mediating role, stating instead that the conflict should be resolved peacefully by the Chinese themselves. Since Beijing has threatened to use military force against Taiwan should it declare independence, Taipei must be careful. But the only path to a peaceful resolution of this standoff is promoting freedom and democracy on the mainland, not censoring free speech in Taiwan.

EXPERTS

Elaine Chao

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Ambassador Harvey Feldman
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Richard D. Fisher, Jr.
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Ambassador James R. Lilley
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James J. Przystup, Ph.D.
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Stephen J. Yates
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SELECTED HERITAGE FOUNDATION STUDIES

Fisher, Richard D., "China's Arms Require Better U.S. Ties with Taiwan," Backgrounder No. 1163, March 11, 1998.

Fisher, Richard D., "How America's Friends Are Building China's Military Power," BackgrounderNo. 1146, November 5, 1997.

Holmes, Kim R., and James J. Przystup, eds., Between Diplomacy and Deterrence: Strategies for U.S. Relations with China, 1997.

Yates, Stephen J., "Economic Freedom Inoculates Taiwan Against the Asian Economic Flu," Executive Memoramdum No. 505, January 14, 1998.

Yates, Stephen J., "Not Another Photo Op: Prioritizing U.S. Interests for a Successful Summit with China," Talking Points No. 24, October 21, 1997.

Yates, Stephen J., "Out of the MFN Trap: The China Policy Act of 1997," Executive Memorandum No. 494, September 26, 1997.

Yates, Stephen J., "No Hong Kong Deal for Taiwan," Asian Studies Center Backgrounder No. 151, August 4, 1997.

Yates, Stephen J., "Out of the MFN Trap: Forging a Better Policy Toward China," Executive Memorandum No. 480, May 16, 1997.

Yates, Stephen J., "Advancing Freedom in China: The Human Rights Issue," Asian Studies Center Backgrounder No. 147, May 7, 1997.

Yates, Stephen J., "The U.S. Interest in Hong Kong," Asian Studies Center Backgrounder No. 145, December 18, 1996.

Yates, Stephen J., "Why Renewing MFN for China Serves U.S. Interests," Asian Studies CenterBackgrounder No. 141, June 25, 1996.

  To access The Heritage Foundation's policy papers in their entirety, please visit Heritage's Web site at www.heritage.org . Publications are available in both HTML and portable document formats. Also visit www.heritage.org/heritage/asiaoffice , for information direct from Heritage's office in Asia.

Endnotes

1.The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Richard D. Fisher to the sections of this chapter that refer to China's military modernization.

2.See floor statement by Senator Connie Mack (R-FL) on July 27, 1997, introducing S. 1083.

3."Statement of Principles on China Policy," signed at the Conservative Summit on China held at The Heritage Foundation on October 6, 1997, and chaired by former Attorney General Edwin Meese III. This statement was signed by such conservative leaders as Edwin J. Feulner of The Heritage Foundation, Don Hodel of the Christian Coalition, and Gary Bauer of the Family Research Council. The objective was to unify conservative leaders on opposite sides of the China-MFN debate behind a common statement of principles. A full copy of the document and a list of signers are available at http://www.heritage.org/heritage/asiaoffice/chinastatement.html .

4.The "Policy for Freedom" package is a collection of 11 separate bills, introduced by 11 separate sponsors, designed to address specific problems in U.S.-China policy with specific policy solutions. Under the leadership of Representative Chris Cox (R-CA), these 11 bills were shepherded through their various committees of jurisdiction and brought to the House floor under one rule (to be voted on consecutively). Two of the bills were added to other legislation passed by the House during the summer of 1997; the remaining nine were passed in early November 1997, barely a week after the presidential summit in Washington.

5.For the full text and key excerpts of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, see

http://www.heritage.org/heritage/asiaoffice/tra.html.

6.Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam are denied MFN status under the terms of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. In March 1998, the Clinton Administration announced its intention to remove Vietnam from this list.

7.The full text of the State Department's annual country reports on human rights are available at http://www.state.gov.

8.Nina Shea, In the Lion's Den (Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman & Holman, 1997), pp. 57-66.

9.Joe McDonald, "China to Boost Military Spending," Associated Press, March 6, 1998, available at http://washingtonpost.com .

10.Richard D. Fisher, "China's Arms Require Better U.S. Ties with Taiwan," Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center Backgrounder No. 1163, March 11, 1998.

11.Bryan T. Johnson, Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, eds., 1998 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 1998).

12.U.S. Department of State, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, January 30, 1998, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/china.html , p. 2.

13.Human Rights Watch/Asia, "China: State Control of Religion," October 1997, p. 2.

14.Ibid., p. 1.

15.Ibid., p. 64.

16.Ibid., p. 23.

17.U.S. Department of State, China Country Report on Human Rights, p. 17.

18.Quoted in Human Rights Watch/Asia, "China: State Control of Religion," p. 15; from "Estimated Statistics of Chinese Catholic Church, 1996," Tripod, Vol. XVI, No. 96, p. 70.

19.U.S. Department of State, China Country Report on Human Rights, p. 17.

20.Quoted in Human Rights Watch/Asia, "China: State Control of Religion," p. 15; from "China's Protestants Could Be as Many as 13.3 Million Protestant Group Says," UCANEWS, February 5, 1997.

21.U.S. Department of State, China Country Report on Human Rights, p. 2.

22.International Republican Institute, "People's Republic of China Election Observation Report," May 15-31, 1994, and May 1995.

23.Lady Margaret Thatcher, "Courage," Heritage Foundation Leadership for America Lecture, December 10, 1997, at http://www.heritage.org/heritage25/lectures/dec97/thatcher.html .

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